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Note
CLAPPER v. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA: ALLOWING THE
FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 TO TURN “INCIDENTALLY”
INTO “CERTAINLY”
LIZ CLARK RINEHART
In February 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,1 which considered whether United
States persons2 who frequently interacted with foreign nationals living
abroad had standing to challenge the constitutionality of 50 U.S.C. Section
1881a, a controversial part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(“FISA”).3 Added through Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of
2008, Section 1881a expanded the scope of FISA surveillance the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”)4 could authorize while
simultaneously reducing judicial power to oversee and supervise the
surveillance.5
In Amnesty International, the plaintiffs claimed the
government was highly likely to intercept their conversations using Section
1881a surveillance due to their numerous international contacts.6 The Court
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1. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
2. A “United States person,” as used in Title 50 of the United States Code, is “a citizen of
the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . , an unincorporated
association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United
States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (i) (2006). This Note will use “person” and “persons” accordingly.
3. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1142.
4. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court chooses eleven federal judges to sit on the FISC
and rule on FISA applications. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2006).
5. See infra Part I.
6. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1142–43. Like the Court and the parties, this Note will refer
to Section 1881a, rather than Section 702, though many commentators refer to the law in question
as Section 702. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Overcollection Problem Identified in the 2011 FISC
Opinion,
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Aug.
22,
2013, 1:52
AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/22/the-overcollection-problem-identified-in-the-2011-fisc-
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held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, however, because they could not
show the government had intercepted their conversations or that
government interception was “certainly impending.”7 Because the plaintiffs
could not show a certainly impending injury through government
interception, the Court also denied standing based on the costs the plaintiffs
incurred to prevent the interception of their communications.8
One of the first reasons the Court cited for denying standing was that
the plaintiffs, as U.S. persons, could not be targeted for surveillance under
the challenged statute.9 According to the Court, to preserve the chain of
causation linking the injury to the statute, the plaintiffs needed to prove
specific third-party actions were certain to occur; namely, that the
government would seek a surveillance order targeting their contacts, the
FISC would approve the order, and the government would successfully
implement the order.10 This analysis created an unnecessarily high
standard. Congress contemplated individuals like the plaintiffs as being
potentially affected by the statute because Section 1881a surveillance could
incidentally intercept their conversations with targeted individuals.11 The
Court, therefore, should have avoided the third-party causation analysis and
instead examined whether the plaintiffs, having been incidentally
intercepted rather than targeted, were asserting a cognizable legal right.12
Traditionally, non-targeted individuals could not assert Fourth
Amendment challenges13 to surveillance that incidentally intercepted their
communications.14 While the incidental interception exception is grounded
in years of precedent, the Court should have reassessed whether the
exception is appropriate given the high risk of substantial government
intrusion Section 1881a surveillance poses.15 As written and as applied,
Section 1881a permits a level of government intrusion distinguishable from
the level of intrusion in cases supporting the incidental interception

opinion/ (“The FISC’s newly-declassified 2011 Opinion on the NSA’s implementation of Section
702 surveillance is both dense and fascinating.”).
7. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1148.
10. Id. at 1148–50.
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. See infra Part IV.C.
13. Although the plaintiffs in Amnesty International asserted several claims, Amnesty Int’l,
133 S. Ct. at 1146, this Note will focus solely on their Fourth Amendment claim, which is the
most plausible challenge to broad-scope surveillance. See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The
Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 67 (2013) (describing the Fourth Amendment
implications of new surveillance technologies).
14. See infra Part II.B.2.
15. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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exception.16 By ignoring the incidental interception question, the Court’s
decision in Amnesty International created an exceptional standing condition
for broad-scope surveillance, not because future plaintiffs will fail to show
they have been intercepted, but because the interception of a non-targeted
individual may not be an injury to a cognizable right.17 Even if the Court
had upheld the incidental interception exception and refused to grant
standing to the plaintiffs, a clear decision interpreting how new forms of
surveillance do or do not affect the exception would have given much
needed guidance to lower courts.18 It would also have signaled to Congress
whether more statutory protections are needed.19 The current scope of the
possible surveillance, however, strongly supports narrowing the exception
to prevent the creation of another class of people who can expect less
Fourth Amendment protection than others.20 In avoiding this issue, the
Court in Amnesty International missed a crucial opportunity.21
I. THE CASE
On July 10, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008.22 The new Section 702, codified as 50 U.S.C.
Section 1881a (Supp. 2012), changed the procedures the federal
government must follow when it conducts surveillance of “non-United
States persons located outside the United States.”23 For example, the
government is no longer required to identify specific targets of surveillance,
and the FISC can no longer require probable cause that the target is a
foreign agent or that foreign agents are using the targeted facility.24 Instead,
the new orders under Section 1881a can be significantly broader and less
particularized, potentially requiring that telecommunications providers
deliver “[a]ll telephone and e-mail communications to and from countries of
foreign policy interest—for example, Russia, Venezuela, or Israel—

16. See infra Part IV.C.2.
17. See infra Part IV.A. But see Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“No one here denies that the Government’s interception of a private telephone or e-mail
conversation amounts to an injury . . . .”).
18. See infra Part IV.C.2.
19. See infra Part IV.C.2.
20. See infra Part IV.C.2.
21. See infra Part IV.C.2.
22. Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 634, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
vacated and remanded sub nom., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011),
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). The case name changed when James R. Clapper, Jr. became the
Director of National Intelligence. See FED. R. APP. P. 43 (c)(2) (automatic substitution of
government officials).
23. Amnesty Int’l, 638 F.3d at 124.
24. Id. at 125–26.
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including communications made to and from U.S. citizens and residents.”25
Additionally, the FISA Amendments Act took the responsibility of
monitoring compliance with statutory requirements away from the FISC
and gave it to the U.S. Attorney General or the Director of National
Intelligence.26
As a result, the government can authorize broader
surveillance on a larger scale, and with less judicial monitoring, than under
the previous version of FISA.27
Amnesty International USA and other organizations filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on the
day the FISA Amendments Act was signed into law.28 They challenged the
facial constitutionality of the Act, claiming their international
communications with individuals residing outside of the United States were
likely to be monitored, and they were forced “to take costly and
burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of those
communications.”29 Both parties filed for summary judgment, with the
government arguing that Section 1881a was constitutional and that the
plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show they had actually
been subject to surveillance under Section 1881a.30
The plaintiffs
responded that it was sufficiently likely that their communications would be
intercepted under Section 1881a and that, alternatively, the measures they
took to prevent the interception should be considered injury for standing
purposes.31 The district court found the plaintiffs did not have standing
because neither their fear of surveillance nor the preventative measures they
took to avoid surveillance met the traditionally requisite standard of
“personal, particularized, concrete injury in fact.”32
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed and remanded back to the district court, finding both the plaintiffs’
reasonable fear of future surveillance and the costs of avoiding surveillance
constituted sufficient injury in fact to support standing, when coupled with
the “objectively reasonable likelihood” that the government would conduct

25. Id. at 126 (quoting Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, Amnesty International USA v.
Blair, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4112), 2009 WL 8185998, at *11. The court noted
that the government had challenged how the plaintiffs characterized the “scope” of the law but had
been unable to specify why the plaintiffs’ description was inaccurate. Id. at 126 n.8.
26. Id. at 126.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 126–27; Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 634 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
29. Amnesty Int’l, 638 F.3d at 127.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Amnesty Int’l, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 643–44.
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surveillance of the plaintiffs’ communications.33 After the Second Circuit
denied rehearing en banc, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to consider whether the Second Circuit’s “novel view of standing”
based on reasonable likelihood of surveillance and reasonable fear of
surveillance met the burden for constitutional standing.34
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Two intersecting analyses determine whether an individual plaintiff
has standing to challenge a program of government surveillance.35 First, the
plaintiff must show a sufficient, “legally protected interest”36 in the
outcome.37 Second, the plaintiff must show the challenged law, and not the
actions of independent third parties, caused the injury to the protected
interest.38 Plaintiffs typically challenge surveillance laws on numerous
grounds,39 but the core complaint is often that the government action
infringes or will infringe upon the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches.40 Because certain people, such as foreign nationals
and individuals who are not the targets of the surveillance, are exempt from
or receive lesser Fourth Amendment protection, they face even steeper
hurdles in showing standing to assert facial challenges.41
A. Article III of the U.S. Constitution Requires That Plaintiffs Have
Standing to Bring a Suit in Federal Court
Article III of the U.S. Constitution permits federal courts to hear only
“Cases” and “Controversies.”42 As the Supreme Court explained in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife,43 “One of [the] landmarks, setting apart the ‘Cases’
33. Amnesty Int’l, 638 F.3d at 134, 138. After the Second Circuit remanded, the government
filed a petition for rehearing en banc on May 12, 2011. Petition for rehearing en banc, Amnesty
Int’l v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4112).
34. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013).
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
37. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 208 (1962).
38. Id. at 208.
39. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1146 (noting that the plaintiffs sought a declaration
that § 1881a violated the First and Fourth Amendment, as well as Article III of the Constitution
and the principles underlying separation of powers); ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 649–50 (6th
Cir. 2007) (explaining that the plaintiffs claimed an NSA surveillance program “violate[d] the
First and Fourth Amendments, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, the Administrative Procedures
Act . . . , Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act . . . , and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act”).
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. See infra Part II.B.
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
43. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

2014]

CLAPPER v. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA

1023

and ‘Controversies’ that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article
III . . . is the doctrine of standing.”44 For a plaintiff to have standing to
bring suit in federal court, she must have “a personal stake in the outcome”
of the case,45 although organizations can represent the injuries of individual
members.46 Whether in the context of an individual or an organization,
standing requires alleging “specific, concrete facts” demonstrating harm,
which the court’s favorable decision would redress.47 The harm must be
“concrete and particularized” as well as “actual or imminent.”48 Moreover,
the line of causation between the challenged action and the harm cannot be
too attenuated49 or rely on the decision of independent parties not named in
the suit.50 Put simply, for a plaintiff to successfully bring a facial
constitutional challenge to a law in federal court, the alleged injury must
have either already happened or be very close to happening, and the injury
must be “fairly . . . trace[able]” to the challenged law.51
1. Plaintiffs Must Show Imminent or Actual, Individualized Harm
That Is Traceable to the Contested Action
Standing requires more than a general possibility that an individual’s
rights will be violated if and when the government acts.52 The Supreme
Court in O’Shea v. Littleton53 was unwilling to accept that the plaintiffs had
alleged sufficient injury for standing simply by claiming that they
represented people in the community who had been the victims of
“selectively discriminatory enforcement and administration of criminal
justice.”54 According to the Court, the plaintiffs had failed to allege an
44. Id. at 560.
45. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
46. Id. at 511.
47. Id. at 508.
48. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
49. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158–60 (1990) (finding the prospect of habeas
relief based on the possible reversal of an uncontested death sentence to be too attenuated to
confer standing).
50. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976) (“[T]he ‘case or
controversy’ limitation of Art. III . . . requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that
fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the
independent action of some third party not before the court.”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509
(1975) (refusing to find standing based on the possible injurious actions of local authorities who
were not named in the suit).
51. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (quoting E. Ky. Welfare Rights, 426 U.S. at 41) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
52. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982) (“It is not enough that the conduct of which
the plaintiff complains will injure someone. The complaining party must also show that he is
within the class of persons who will be concretely affected.”).
53. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
54. Id. at 491 (quoting the complaint).
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immediate threat of injury.55 The Court refused to assume that in the future
the plaintiffs would commit illegal activities for which the government
would choose to prosecute them, and thus subject them to the alleged
discriminatory system.56
Similarly, when determining whether the threat of injury was sufficient
for standing in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,57 the Court continued to
assume that plaintiffs were generally law-abiding and that police followed
proper procedure.58 In Lyons, the Supreme Court considered whether an
individual had standing to seek an injunction banning police officers’ use of
chokeholds.59 Although the police had previously placed Lyons in a
chokehold during a traffic stop, the Court determined there was no “real and
immediate threat” that the police would put Lyons in a chokehold again,
despite the allegation that Los Angeles police “routinely” placed individuals
in chokeholds.60 According to the Court, it was “untenable” to believe
police placed everyone in chokeholds, and it was unlikely Lyons would
have another similar interaction with the police, unless he broke the law.61
As further evidence of the unlikelihood that Lyons would be choked again,
the Court noted that after Lyons was placed in a chokehold, he had no more
“unfortunate encounters” with the police before he filed his complaint.62
Because he could not show the event in question was likely to repeat, Lyons
did not meet the requirements for standing to seek injunctive relief in a
federal court.63
As evidenced by the Court’s refusal to relax standing requirements in
response to the threat of dangerous police practices, the severity of the
potential injury creates no exception to the requirement of individualized
and particular harm. In Whitmore v. Arkansas,64 for example, the Supreme
Court considered whether a prisoner sentenced to death had standing to
contest the death sentence of another convicted person.65 The inmate
seeking to show standing, Whitmore, argued that because the other inmate,
55. Id. at 498.
56. Id.
57. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
58. Id. at 105.
59. Id. at 97–98.
60. Id. at 105. At the time of the Court’s decision, the Los Angeles police department had
temporarily banned the use of the hold in question, but the Court concluded that because the ban
was temporary, it did not make the case moot. Id. at 100–101.
61. Id. at 108.
62. Id. Five months passed between when Lyons was placed in the choke-hold and when he
filed the complaint. Id.
63. Id. at 113. The Court stressed that Lyons could still seek relief through damages and that
state courts could grant broader standing than the federal courts. Id.
64. 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
65. Id. at 151.
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Simmons, had not sought appellate review of his sentence, the “heinous”66
nature of Simmons’s crimes would not be included in the Supreme Court of
Arkansas’s comparison analysis of how the death penalty is applied in the
state.67 Whitmore argued that, although he had exhausted his appeals, he
could still obtain federal habeas corpus relief, which would grant him a new
trial.68 If he was convicted and sentenced to death again, he would seek
another appellate review of his sentence.69 Because Whitmore’s crime was
not as terrible as Simmons’s, Whitmore argued, the omission of Simmons’s
crime from the database of death penalty crimes could “arbitrarily skew[]”
the appellate court’s comparative analysis.70
The Court found Whitmore’s alleged injury based on several possible
events “too speculative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Art. III court.”71 In
addition to questioning whether Whitmore would obtain habeas relief, the
Court was unconvinced the Supreme Court of Arkansas might reverse
Whitmore’s death sentence after Simmons’s crimes were added to the
database.72 The Court also refused to “create an exception to traditional
standing doctrine for this case,” even though Whitmore argued that the
death penalty presented special circumstances where society had an
unusually high interest in promoting fair application of the law.73 In flatly
rejecting this proposal, the Court reminded Whitmore that Article III
requirements are grounded in the Constitution and cannot be manipulated
for the sake of “an appealing case.”74
Although the likelihood of injury cannot be overly speculative, as it
was in Whitmore, standing does not require plaintiffs to wait for the injury
to occur.75 The Supreme Court has found standing based on the threat of
66. Id. at 157. The other inmate, Ronald Gene Simmons, murdered fourteen members of his
family and two other people, id. at 151, while Whitmore murdered a woman during a robbery. Id.
at 157.
67. Id. at 157.
68. Id. at 156.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 156–57.
71. Id. at 157.
72. Id. The Court pointed out that in the original consideration of Whitmore’s death
sentence, the Arkansas court “simply noted that defendants in similar robbery-murder capital
crimes had also been sentenced to death,” and there was no indication that the court would
consider Simmons’s crimes in Whitmore’s sentencing because Simmons had committed multiple
murders during a killing spree, rather than a single robbery-murder like Whitmore. Id.
73. Id. at 161.
74. Id. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, asserted that the Court was within its authority to
consider the case if it could prevent the possibly unconstitutional execution of Simmons. Id. at
167, 177–78 (“The Court certainly has the authority to expand or contract a common-law doctrine
where necessary to serve an important judicial or societal interest.”).
75. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967) (allowing pharmaceutical
companies to challenge regulations on drug labels before the regulations were put into effect
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enforcement of a law when it is apparent that the law is directed at the
plaintiffs. For instance, in Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n,76 the
Court granted standing to booksellers seeking to challenge a law that
prohibited the selling or displaying of adult materials to juveniles.77 The
Court determined the statute was “aimed directly at [the] plaintiffs, who, if
their interpretation of the statute [was] correct, [would] have to take
significant and costly compliance measures or risk criminal prosecution.”78
That the state had not yet enforced the law or prosecuted any of the
plaintiffs was not determinative, the Court reasoned, because “[t]he State
ha[d] not suggested that the newly enacted law [would] not be enforced,
and [the Court saw] no reason to assume otherwise.”79 The Court also
emphasized that the alleged harm was that of “self-censorship,” which “can
be realized even without an actual prosecution.”80
The Court has found standing in other pre-enforcement cases
involving laws that would clearly affect certain individuals, such as the
Medicaid recipients challenging nursing home decisions in Blum v.
Yaretsky.81 The Court in Blum held that the nursing home residents had
standing to challenge the procedural adequacy of facility-initiated transfers
even though there was no indication the residents bringing suit would be
transferred.82 The Court recognized the regulations in question did not
directly cause the alleged potential injury because the nursing home board
made individual determinations.83 The regulations, however, required that
facilities create the board, and the board’s determination could result in a

because “the regulation is directed at them in particular[,] it requires them to make significant
changes in their everyday business practices[, and] if they fail to observe the Commissioner’s rule
they are quite clearly exposed to the imposition of strong sanctions”), abrogated on unrelated
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
76. 484 U.S. 383 (1988).
77. Id. at 387–88.
78. Id. at 392.
79. Id. at 393.
80. Id.
81. 457 U.S. 991, 994–95, 1000 (1982).
82. Id. at 999–1000.
83. Id.; see also id. at 1003 (“[R]espondents are not challenging particular state regulations or
procedures, and their arguments concede that the decision to discharge or transfer a patient
originates not with state officials, but with nursing homes that are privately owned and operated.
Their lawsuit, therefore, seeks to hold state officials liable for the actions of private parties, and
the injunctive relief they have obtained requires the State to adopt regulations that will prohibit the
private conduct of which they complain.”).
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transfer.84 Thus, a law is not required to directly target an individual with a
specific injury for it to pose sufficient potential harm to confer standing.85
2. The Supreme Court Has Been Unwilling to Make Exceptions to
the Standing Doctrine for Suits Alleging Violations of
Constitutional Rights Through Surveillance
Unlike standing cases related to overt government action, programs of
broad government surveillance pose a different problem for plaintiffs
seeking to show standing because so much about the programs is unknown
and speculative.86 In Laird v. Tatum,87 a group of civilians brought a suit
contesting an Army program that involved collecting information from
public news sources, open meetings, and local law enforcement.88 Because
the government was collecting and compiling public information, the
plaintiffs could not allege that the government had violated their rights by
observing private affairs.89 In holding that there was no standing, the Court
emphasized that in order to support standing based on an alleged “chilling”
of the exercise of First Amendment rights, plaintiffs must show more than
“knowledge” of a government program or “fear that . . . the agency might in
the future take some other . . . action detrimental to that individual.”90 The
Court also was troubled by the possible scope of judicial power over the
executive branch that would result from granting the plaintiffs standing,
explaining that Congress is the proper “continuing monitor[]” of “Executive
action.”91
At least two federal appellate courts have interpreted Laird to hold that
the potential “chilling effect” of surveillance was insufficient to confer
Article III standing.92 In United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan,93 the

84. Id. at 994–95.
85. See id. at 1000–01 (explaining that the threatened injury was that the nursing home
administrators would decide to move the patients). The Court ultimately held the facilities were
not state actors and their procedures could not violate Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 1012.
86. See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 653 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining to find standing
because, among other weaknesses, “the plaintiffs do not—and because of the State Secrets
Doctrine cannot—produce any evidence that any of their own communications have ever been
intercepted by [the federal government’s surveillance program] or without warrants”).
87. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id. at 11.
91. Id. at 15. Justice Douglas, writing for the dissent, called the program of military
surveillance “a gross repudiation of our traditions,” id. at 23, citing a history of “civilian
supremacy and subordination of military power.” Id. at 19. Justice Douglas found the majority’s
conclusion that respondents lacked standing “too transparent for serious argument.” Id. at 24.
92. See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 661 (6th Cir. 2007) (reviewing Laird and
concluding that a “chilling” effect is not sufficient injury regardless of the type of speech the
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United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused
to find standing to challenge a surveillance program, even though the
plaintiffs alleged they had been targets of surveillance in the past and that
they were likely targets of surveillance in the future.94 Because the
plaintiffs had not alleged that their surveillance was a direct result of the
challenged law, the court found that the plaintiffs appeared to be
challenging the entirety of the executive branch’s intelligence-gathering
program, which was too much of a “generalized grievance” to meet the
injury requirement.95
Not all courts have chosen to apply Laird to modern surveillance
cases. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
held in Jewel v. NSA96 that plaintiffs, who were telephone customers, had
standing to challenge the government’s application of several surveillance
statutes.97 The court found no issue with the plaintiffs’ allegations of
particularized injury because at least one plaintiff had alleged she had been
a target of the broad, dragnet surveillance program and described the
program in great detail.98 The court distinguished the case from other
surveillance cases because the present case was at the “initial pleading
stage” rather than the summary judgment stage, during which the court
expects to review a full record.99 At this stage in the proceedings, the court
concluded, the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient injury for standing.100

government action affects); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375,
1378 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that Laird requires a direct harm to plaintiffs).
93. 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
94. Id. at 1380.
95. Id. at 1381 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ACLU, 493 F.3d at 648 (holding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program). In
ACLU, the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ theory that they sustained injury by installing
protective measures to prevent interception because the plaintiffs could not produce any evidence
that they had been subjected to the surveillance or that they would be subjected to the surveillance.
Id. at 648, 673–75.
96. 673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011).
97. Id. at 906. Jewel alleged constitutional violations as well as violations of “the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”),
the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).” Id.
(citations omitted).
98. Id. at 910.
99. Id. at 911.
100. Id. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs in this case may eventually “face similar
procedural, evidentiary and substantive barriers as the plaintiffs in ACLU.” Id.
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B. The Standing Requirements to Bring Fourth Amendment Challenges
to Government Surveillance Programs Require a Consideration of
the Merits of the Case, but Are Also Subject to Individual
Exceptions
The issue of standing in Fourth Amendment cases is “subsumed” by
the Fourth Amendment analysis.101 Standing to challenge surveillance
based on the Fourth Amendment therefore requires that surveillance affect a
right protected by the Fourth Amendment. Since Berger v. New York,102 the
Supreme Court has recognized the potential of wiretapping laws to violate
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether the government physically
trespasses on an individual’s property, if the laws are broad enough to
authorize “general warrant[s].”103 Absent special circumstances, a warrant
may still be required to avoid Fourth Amendment violations even if the
method of surveillance is narrowed. For example, the Court in Katz v.
United States104 refused to create an exception that would allow law
enforcement to wiretap public pay phones absent a warrant, reasoning that
surveillance did not fall within the exceptions for search incident to arrest,
“hot pursuit,” or suspect consent.105 Since Katz and Berger, however,
Congress has passed legislation designed to conform to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence while still allowing law enforcement to use wiretapping to
investigate crimes.106 Concurrently, courts have crafted exceptions to
Fourth Amendment protection that expand the government’s ability to
conduct surveillance, notably the lack of Fourth Amendment protection for
foreign individuals living abroad107 and for U.S. persons who are not the
targets of the surveillance.108
101. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (“[W]e think the better analysis forthrightly
focuses on the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than
on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.”). The Court further
explained, however, that “nothing we say here casts the least doubt on . . . [the] general
proposition [that] the issue of standing involves two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a
particular legal right has alleged ‘injury in fact,’ and, second, whether the proponent is asserting
his own legal rights and interests.” Id.
102. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
103. Id. at 64; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“The Government’s
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and
seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
104. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
105. Id. at 357–58 nn.20–22 (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (search
incident to arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (search during “hot pursuit”);
Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (search after suspect consents)).
106. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 792 n.30 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
plain thrust of Title III appears to be to accommodate the holdings of Berger and Katz . . . .”).
107. See infra Part II.B.1.
108. See infra Part II.B.2.
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1. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Protect Foreign Nationals
from Surveillance
Because standing requires plaintiffs show a cognizable right, one
significant hurdle for claims like those in Amnesty International is that the
Fourth Amendment does not reach searches conducted of foreign citizens in
foreign countries.109 In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,110 the Supreme
Court determined that the history of the Fourth Amendment showed that the
Framers did not intend its protections to extend beyond U.S. territories.111
The Court further explained that for an alien to benefit from Fourth
Amendment protections while in the United States, she must develop
“substantial connections with this country,”112 which the plaintiff, by being
detained in the United States for only a few days at the time of the search,
had not done.113 According to the Court, any additional protections were
political issues and should be created “through diplomatic understanding,
treaty, or legislation.”114 Lower courts have interpreted Verdugo-Urquidez
to mean that foreign nationals cannot challenge wiretap evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds.115
2.

The Fourth Amendment Does Not Protect Non-Targeted
Individuals Whose Communications Are Incidentally
Intercepted

The Supreme Court approved the use of incidentally intercepted
communications in United States v. Kahn.116 In Kahn, the government had
obtained a judicial order under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968117 to wiretap a suspected bookmaker’s phone and
intercept his conversations and the conversations of “others as yet

109. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990).
110. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
111. Id. at 266 (“[I]t was never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the
actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United States territory.”).
112. Id. at 271.
113. Id. (“But this sort of presence—lawful but involuntary—is not of the sort to indicate any
substantial connection with our country.”).
114. Id. at 275.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 893 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does not apply to searches by U.S. agents in foreign
territories); United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to nonresident aliens whose property is searched in a foreign
country, there is no need to decide whether the Bahamian officials acted as agents of the United
States or whether the wiretap was a joint venture. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
simply is not available to Emmanuel with respect to the Bahamian wiretap evidence.”).
116. 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
117. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
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unknown.”118 In the course of the wiretap, the government intercepted
conversations implicating the bookmaker’s wife as being part of the
gambling operation, and the couple was indicted on the basis of the wiretap
evidence.119 The Court determined that the wife’s conversations were
properly intercepted under the order because the language broadened the
targets of the wiretap to “others as yet unknown.”120 The Court therefore
refused to interpret the language of Title III as requiring law enforcement to
identify all those who could possibly be intercepted.121 In doing so, the
Court denied that it was creating the possibility of “virtual general
warrants” because the judicial order was limited by time, scope, and judicial
monitoring requirements.122 Although Congress had enacted Title III in
part to protect privacy, the Court reasoned, the legislature had also intended
to provide law enforcement with “a weapon against the operations of
organized crime.”123 Requiring law enforcement to identify everyone who
could be intercepted by a wiretap would defeat that purpose.124 As such,
Title III did not require that intercepted communications be confined to
those of a named party; intercepted communications could include
conversations between individuals who were not listed as targets of the
wiretap.125
Lower courts have interpreted Kahn to hold that interceptions of
“incidental” parties do not violate the Fourth Amendment.126 At least one
118. 415 U.S. at 145.
119. Id. at 147–48.
120. Id. at 152–53 (“[T]he statute says: identification is required only of those ‘known’ to be
‘committing the offense.’ Had Congress wished to engraft a separate requirement of
‘discoverability’ onto the provisions of Title III, it surely would have done so in language plainer
than that now embodied in § 2518.”).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 154.
123. Id. at 151.
124. See id. at 157 (“The clear implication of [the statutory] language is that when there is
probable cause to believe that a particular telephone is being used to commit an offense but no
particular person is identifiable, a wire interception order may, nevertheless, properly issue under
the statute.”).
125. Id. (“Congress could not have intended that the authority to intercept must be limited to
those conversations between a party named in the order and others, since at least in some cases,
the order might not name any specific party at all.”).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that the
government’s interception of the defendant’s communications was legal even though the
defendant was not listed on the surveillance order because the order covered the device under
surveillance, not individuals); United States v. Figueroa, 757 F.2d 466, 472 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that Title III’s allowance for intercepting conversations of parties “as yet unknown” does
not violate the Fourth Amendment); In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1015 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (citing
Kahn for the proposition that “[i]t is settled beyond peradventure that incidental collections
occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible acquisitions do not render those acquisitions
unlawful”). Kahn confirmed holdings from lower courts that considered the issue previously.
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court, however, has refused to expand the definition of “incidental” to
include individuals whom the government knew were probably involved in
the illegal activities being investigated.127 In United States v. Bin Laden,128
the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
government should have obtained permission before intercepting the
communications of an American citizen who was suspected of being
involved in al Qaeda activities.129 The government argued that the
noncitizen targets of the wiretap could not assert a Fourth Amendment
violation, and the incidental interception exception permitted the
government to intercept the communications of citizens who used the
tapped lines.130 The court, however, distinguished the precedent cited by
the government because the cases referred to incidentally discovered
crimes, not incidentally intercepted people.131 The court concluded that the
citizen was one of the potential targets because of his suspected affiliation
with the targeted organization.132 In doing so, the court refused to expand
the definition of “incidental” beyond “unanticipated.”133 The defendant, the
court concluded, had a “reasonable expectation of privacy in his home and
cellular phones.”134 Critically, the court’s interpretation still permits
incidental, warrantless interceptions, so long as they are truly incidental.135

See, e.g., United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (“If probable cause has
been shown as to one such participant, the statements of the other participants may be intercepted
if pertinent to the investigation.”).
127. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 281–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Ultimately,
the Court holds that with respect to the electronic surveillance of the home and cellular phones,
El–Hage was not intercepted ‘incidentally’ because he was not an unanticipated user of those
telephones and because he was believed to be a participant in the activities being investigated.”),
aff’d sub nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.
2008).
128. 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
129. Id. at 269, 281–82.
130. Id. at 281.
131. Id.
132. Id. (“The Government asks the Court . . . to find that, although the Government clearly
foresaw the interception of El-Hage’s conversations and suspected his involvement with al Qaeda,
the interception was nonetheless incidental. . . . El-Hage was a known and contemplated
interceptee of electronic surveillance of his home and cellular phones (even if he was not officially
deemed a target) . . . .”).
133. Id. Judge Sand ultimately concluded that, although the government should have obtained
executive permission before tapping the citizen’s phone lines, the evidence obtained would not be
subject to exclusion “because it would not have the deterrent effect which the exclusionary rule
requires and because the surveillance was undertaken in good faith.” Id. at 282.
134. Id. at 281.
135. See id. (calling the government’s conceptualization of the incidental interception
exemption an “expan[sion]”).
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court reversed
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, rejecting the
lower court’s “novel view of standing” and concluding that the plaintiffs
had not alleged sufficient injury for Article III standing.136 Justice Alito,
writing for the majority, found that the threat of injury based on fear of
surveillance was “too speculative” and that plaintiffs cannot be permitted to
create an injury by taking steps to prevent surveillance that may never
occur.137
The majority first explained that Article III standing is crucial to
maintaining separation of powers within the federal government because it
“prevent[s] the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the
political branches.”138 In accordance with this function, the majority
reasoned, the Court has required a more stringent standing analysis when
considering cases challenging the constitutionality of actions taken by the
legislative or executive branches.139 In all cases, the majority continued,
standing based on future injuries requires that the injurious event be
“certainly impending,” not just “possible.”140 The majority distinguished
this standard from the “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard the
Second Circuit used when that court held that the plaintiffs had standing,
calling the latter standard “inconsistent” with the former.141
The Court cited five reasons why the plaintiffs’ fears of surveillance
were too speculative to constitute standing. First, the individuals with
whom the plaintiffs communicated were not certain targets of government
surveillance and the plaintiffs “ha[d] set forth no specific facts
demonstrating that the communications of their foreign contacts will be
targeted.”142 Second, the government could conduct surveillance without
invoking Section 1881a, perhaps by using an older provision of FISA,
which would prevent the plaintiffs from claiming their alleged injury was

136. 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013).
137. Id. at 1143, 1151 (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm
on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”).
138. Id. at 1146.
139. Id. at 1147 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)). According to the
majority, the judiciary has been especially hesitant “to review actions of the political branches in
the fields of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.” Id.
140. Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
141. Id. The Court acknowledged that plaintiffs can occasionally show standing based on a
“substantial risk” of injury, but concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet even that reduced
burden. Id. at 1150 n.5.
142. Id. at 1148–49. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs could not be targets because
Section 1881a does not authorize surveillance that intentionally targets U.S. persons. Id. at 1148.
But see Part IV.B.

1034

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:1018

“fairly traceable” to Section 1881a.143 Third, the FISC might decline to
authorize the government’s request and the surveillance would not occur.144
Fourth, even if it did obtain FISC authorization under Section 1881a, the
government could fail to intercept the targeted communications.145 Fifth,
the government could successfully conduct surveillance of the targets, but
not conduct surveillance of any of the plaintiffs’ communications with the
targeted individuals.146 The sum total of this “chain of possibilities”
amounted to too much speculation for the Court.147
The majority also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that they suffered
present injury because they took measures to safeguard the confidentiality
of their communications from government surveillance.148 The Court
pointed out that the Second Circuit had “improperly water[ed] down the
fundamental requirements of Article III [standing]” by allowing the
plaintiffs to claim self-incurred harm based on fear of an event that was
“not certainly impending.”149 Furthermore, the Court continued, the
plaintiffs had a “similar incentive” to take precautions before the FISA
Amendments Act, when the government could still conduct surveillance of
their clients’ communications, albeit under different circumstances.150 The
Court compared the plaintiffs’ fear of surveillance with that of the plaintiffs
in Laird, reiterating that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an
adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat
of specific future harm.”151 Likewise, the Court distinguished this case
from other cases in which plaintiffs established standing based on fear
because in those cases the plaintiffs had provided “concrete evidence” that
the challenged action would “unquestionably” affect them.152
143. Id. at 1149. The majority explained that the government could also obtain surveillance
information from foreign governments or possibly “conduct FISA-exempt human and technical
surveillance programs that are governed by Executive Order 12333.” Id.
144. Id. at 1149–50.
145. Id. at 1150.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1150–51. The Court was unimpressed by the plaintiffs’ evidence supporting their
claim of present injury. According to the Court: “For all the focus on respondents’ supposed need
to travel abroad in light of potential § 1881a surveillance, respondents cite only one specific
instance of travel: an attorney’s trip to New York City to meet with other lawyers.” Id. at 1151
n.6.
149. Id. at 1151.
150. Id. at 1152 (citing one plaintiff’s declaration that he was aware of government
surveillance of his clients’ communications before Section 1881a was enacted).
151. Id. at 1152 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
152. Id. at 1153–54. Specifically, the Court distinguished Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
because the injury in Laidlaw—the discharge of pollutants—was “concededly ongoing,” rather
than speculative. Id. at 1153 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
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Finally, the majority was unconvinced that denying the plaintiffs
standing would “insulate the government’s surveillance activities from
meaningful judicial review.”153 The Court first pointed to the FISC as
evidence of judicial review and protection from Fourth Amendment
violations.154 The Court also noted that individuals could challenge the
acquired surveillance if the government attempts to use it “in judicial or
administrative proceedings.”155 Alternatively, the Court suggested, “any
electronic communications service provider” can challenge a governmental
directive under Section 1881a before the FISC.156 The plaintiffs, however,
lacked standing because their alleged injury was not a “certainly
impending” injury and the protections against such an injury cannot be used
to “manufacture” standing.157
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
dissented from the majority opinion, claiming that the harm posed by
government surveillance was highly likely to occur, not “speculative.” 158
Additionally, based on the Court’s previous explanations of “certainly
impending,” Justice Breyer contended that the plaintiffs had shown
sufficient injury for standing.159
Justice Breyer first outlined the changes in FISA that occurred due to
the FISA Amendments Act, emphasizing that the government could now
conduct “programmatic” surveillance of a broader category of foreign
individuals with less judicial oversight.160 Next, Justice Breyer explained
that the plaintiffs frequently engage in the types of communications subject
to surveillance under FISA with individuals, such as family members and

528 U.S. 167, 183–184 (2000)). In a second case cited by the plaintiffs, Meese v. Keene, the
Court pointed out that the government had already used the law in question to deem the films the
plaintiff wished to display illegal “political propaganda.” Id. at 1153 (citing Meese v. Keene, 481
U.S. 465, 467, 473–75 (1987)). Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Monsanto v.
Geertson because the farmers in Monsanto were able to provide scientific evidence of bee
pollination behaviors that substantiated their fears of cross-pollination, raising it above “mere
conjecture about possible . . . actions.” Id. at 1153–54 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed
Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754–55, 2754–55 n.3 (2010)).
153. Id. at 1154 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 60, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.
Ct. 1138 (2013) (No. 11-1025), 2012 WL 4361439, at *60) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1154–55. Thus, AT&T or Verizon could challenge an order issued under Section
1881a, but as of July 29, 2013, no telecommunications provider had done so. Letter from Reggie
B. Walton, Presiding Judge of FISC, to Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. Senator 7–10 (July 29, 2013),
available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/download/honorable-patrick-j-leahy.
157. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1155.
158. Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1155, 1160. Justice Breyer did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, only
whether they had standing. Id. at 1165.
160. Id. at 1156.
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friends, who would not have been subject to surveillance before Section
1881a was enacted.161 This fact, combined with the government’s
motivation to investigate terrorist threats using electronic surveillance,
documented use of electronic surveillance to investigate terrorist threats,
and “expanding” ability to conduct electronic surveillance, led Justice
Breyer to conclude “there is a high probability that the Government will
[use Section 1881a to] intercept at least some electronic communication to
which at least some of the plaintiffs are parties.”162
Justice Breyer also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of
“certainly impending” injury, claiming that in many cases “the word
‘certainly’ . . . emphasizes, rather than literally defines, the immediately
following term ‘impending.’”163 Justice Breyer cited several cases in which
the Court had found standing based on the realistic probability of injury or a
“genuine threat,” which Justice Breyer found the plaintiffs had shown in
this case, in addition to present harm incurred attempting to minimize the
threat.164 Further, Justice Breyer distinguished the cases on which the
majority relied to deny standing, particularly Lujan, which the dissent
claimed focused on “when, not whether, the threatened harm would
occur.”165 According to Justice Breyer, “when” the harm will occur in the
instant case was not at issue because “the ongoing threat of terrorism
means . . . the relevant interceptions will likely take place imminently, if not
now.”166
IV. ANALYSIS
In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court found it
detrimental to standing that the plaintiffs, as U.S. persons, could not be

161. Id. at 1157–58.
162. Id. at 1160.
163. Id. at 1161.
164. Id. at 1162–63. For example, Justice Breyer cited Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988), in which the Court found sufficient injury in an ordinance forbidding landlords from
raising rent prices “even though the landlords had not shown (1) that they intended to raise the
relevant rents to the point of causing unreasonably severe hardship; (2) that the tenants would
challenge those increases; or (3) that the city’s hearing examiners and arbitrators would find
against the landlords.” Id. at 1161 (citing Pennell, 485 U.S. at 8). Justice Breyer also cited Davis
v. Federal Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724 (2008), in which a candidate for office was found
to have standing to challenge a campaign financing law even though his opponent “had decided
not to take advantage of the increased contribution limits that the statute would have allowed,”
because the Court thought the chance that the opponent would invoke the statute was “realistic
and impending.” Id. at 1161–62 (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 734) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
165. Id. at 1165 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564–65 n.2 (1992)).
166. Id.
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targets of Section 1881a surveillance.167 As such, the majority opinion
focused on the string of events that needed to occur for plaintiffs’
communications to be intercepted, leading the Court to decide there were
too many unlikely events to find standing based on imminent
interception.168 This conclusion, aside from its troubling implications for
privacy, stretches the limits of plausibility. Section 1881a surveillance is
entirely different from conventional wiretapping; it is broad, indiscriminate,
and long-lasting.169 The assumed targets are exactly the types of clients
with whom the plaintiffs speak, and precisely the types of targets that were
not permitted under the previous law.170 It seems incredible that, of the
numerous plaintiffs, none will have at least one conversation intercepted
under Section 1881a’s authority.171 The reasoning that supports the Court’s
assertion to the contrary will further confuse the analysis for imminent
injury in future cases.172
This case gave the Court an opportunity, subsequently missed, to
reexamine the limits of the incidental interception exception to the Fourth
Amendment. Even if the plaintiffs could have shown the government used
Section 1881a to intercept their communications, the incidental interception
exception could have prevented the plaintiffs from asserting a Fourth
Amendment violation.173 The existence of the Fourth Amendment
provisions and the other minimization requirements in Section 1881a,
however, indicate Congress was concerned with incidental interception of
U.S. persons.174 The Court should have therefore analyzed the plaintiffs’
standing to bring a pre-enforcement Fourth Amendment challenge under a

167. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1148 (majority opinion).
168. Id. at 1148.
169. Id. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the breadth of surveillance authorized by §
1881a); Amnesty Int’l v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2011) (Lynch, J., concurring)
(explaining the new powers obtained when Section 1881a was enacted); Caroline Wilson, A Guide
to FISA § 1881a: The Law Behind It All, PRIVACYINTERNATIONAL.ORG (June 13, 2013),
https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/a-guide-to-fisa-ss1881a-the-law-behind-it-all
(summarizing the provisions of the law and noting that Congress originally enacted FISA “in
response to abuses in domestic intelligence surveillance powers”). Surveillance authorizations
under Section 1881a can be effective for up to a year. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (Supp. 2012).
170. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1157–58.
171. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (“The association must allege that its
members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves
brought suit.”).
172. See, e.g., Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (claiming, before
discussing the Court’s analysis of imminent injury in Amnesty International, that “[t]he Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding how imminent a threat must be in order to support standing . . .
has been less than clear”).
173. See infra Part IV.C.
174. See infra Part IV.B.
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less burdensome imminence standard.175 In conducting that analysis, the
Court would have been forced to examine when incidental interceptions
become so anticipated and comprehensive as to become too much like
targeted interceptions.176
As the government’s ability to conduct
surveillance improves, a narrower incidental interception exception would
better preserve existing Fourth Amendment privacy rights.177 Nonetheless,
even if the Court had been unwilling to read the Fourth Amendment more
broadly, a complete definition of the limits of the incidental interception
doctrine would have helped Congress determine whether Section 1881a
should be amended to afford greater protection to U.S. persons who
communicate with foreign nationals.178
A. The Standing Analysis in Amnesty International Creates an
Unacceptably Broad Exception for Government Surveillance
In Amnesty International, the Supreme Court explained that the
standing analysis is “especially rigorous” when the Court must decide
whether the executive or legislative branch has violated the Constitution.179
While not explicitly admitting that it was creating an exception for
intelligence gathering activities, the Court stressed that it “ha[s] often found
a lack of standing in cases in which the Judiciary has been requested to
review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence
gathering and foreign affairs.”180 To support this implied deference to the
executive, the Court cited the importance of separation of powers and
limiting judicial authority.181
The Court’s deference is misplaced and ill-suited for the problems
broad, indiscriminate surveillance poses. The FISA’s only check on the
executive branch is the FISC system,182 which has shown itself unwilling to
deny surveillance applications, rejecting only eleven since 1979.183 At the
same time, the number of applications has increased dramatically to more

175. See infra Part IV.B.
176. See infra Part IV.C.1.
177. See infra Part IV.C.2.
178. See infra Part IV.C.2.
179. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (majority opinion) (quoting
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1146.
182. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2006) (describing the composition and function of the FISC).
183. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1159 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the FISC rarely
fails to approve an application); see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders
1979–2012, EPIC (May 4, 2012), http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html.
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than nine times the amount submitted in the first year.184 This imbalance is
hardly a countervailing check on a substantial executive power.185 In
addition, the FISC has admitted it has inadequate resources and information
to monitor the activities of agencies once the application has been
approved.186 Given the immense power at stake and the weakness of the
current judicial check, the correct way to create a balanced separation of
powers would have been to expand the Supreme Court’s authority through
standing, or at least not to constrict it.
Instead, the Supreme Court has crafted a standing requirement that is
more difficult for plaintiffs to meet because of the inherent nature of
governmental surveillance. Based on the Court’s reasoning in Amnesty
International, to prove they have standing, plaintiffs must show they have
been or will certainly be the targets of surveillance.187 Assuming the
plaintiffs are able to reach the discovery phase,188 the government is likely
to invoke the state secrets doctrine to avoid disclosing information, as it has
in the past.189 The end result is that the plaintiffs will be unable to show the
requisite actual injury since they will be unable show specific knowledge of
the surveillance, yet they cannot show specific knowledge of surveillance if
they are not permitted discovery.190 This “catch-22” essentially insulates
government surveillance programs from constitutional scrutiny.191
184. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders, supra note 183. In 1979, the FISC
was presented with 199 applications. Id. In 2012, there were 1,856 applications. Id.
185. Carol D. Leonnig, Court: Ability to Police U.S. Spying Program Limited, WASH. POST,
Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-ability-to-police-us-spyingprogram-limited/2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html?hpid=z1.
186. Id.
187. See Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1148 (majority opinion) (asserting that the plaintiffs’
allegations of interception were not “certainly impending”).
188. See Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902, 911 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding standing when considering
a motion to dismiss pre-discovery, but noting that “[u]ltimately [the plaintiffs] may face similar
procedural, evidentiary and substantive barriers as the plaintiffs” in cases considered after a record
has been developed through discovery).
189. See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 650, 650 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the
government invoked the evidentiary elements of the state secrets doctrine when refusing to
provide plaintiffs with information about surveillance, but adding that had the surveillance
program in question not been public knowledge, the nonjusticiability elements of the state secrets
doctrine may have also applied).
190. See Jewel, 673 F.3d at 911 (explaining the evidentiary hurdles facing plaintiffs
challenging a governmental surveillance program); see also id. at 908 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1801(k))
(describing FISA’s private right of action).
191. While the recent revelations of Edward Snowden as to the NSA surveillance program do
provide more concrete information for plaintiffs, there is questionable wisdom in relying on
government leaks as a check on executive power. See generally The NSA Files, THE GUARDIAN,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (explaining the
timeline of the Snowden leaks and what little is known of the entire content). See also Mark
Mazzetti and Michael S. Schmidt, Officials Say U.S. May Never Know Extent of Snowden’s Leaks,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2013, at A1 (reporting that due to technological inadequacies the government
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Although the Court in Amnesty International suggested that, at a criminal
trial, plaintiffs could challenge the law if the government attempts to use
evidence collected through surveillance,192 this approach has been
unsuccessful in the past and neglects the large bulk of surveillance that does
not result in criminal trials.193 Because showing actual interception is
almost impossible, the Court has inadvertently granted the government
functional immunity for broad surveillance programs, provided the
government keeps the program details a secret.194 The problem is, of
course, that the very secretiveness of the program is part of the harm.195
B. Because Congress Contemplated That Section 1881a Would Affect
U.S. Persons Like the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ Standing to Bring Suit
Should Be Analyzed Without Focusing on the Actions of Third
Parties
The Court found it notable that the plaintiffs were not in a class of
people targeted by the statute,196 but the text of Section 1881a indicates
Congress considered the statute would possibly affect U.S. persons.197 If, as
it seems likely, the plaintiffs are individuals who are directly affected by the
statute, they should have been permitted to assert standing without showing

may never know what data Snowden took). Similarly, government officials’ voluntary disclosure
promises seem to be inadequate protection. See Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to
Secret Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, at A3 (reporting that the government announced it
will be more diligent about disclosing to defendants when evidence has been obtained through a
FISC order, but this had not been the practice in the past).
192. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1154 n.8 (providing as an example United States v. Damrah,
412 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2005), in which a defendant unsuccessfully attempted to suppress evidence
collected through FISA-approved surveillance).
193. See Savage, supra note 191 (“[N]ational security prosecutors . . . had not been
alerting . . . defendants that evidence in their cases had stemmed from wiretapping their
conversations without a warrant.”).
194. At least one court has found that the state secret doctrine cannot apply when the details of
the purportedly secret program are public knowledge. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush,
507 F. 3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In light of extensive government disclosures about the
[Terrorist Surveillance Program], the government is hard-pressed to sustain its claim that the very
subject matter of the litigation is a state secret.”).
195. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1952–58
(2013) (describing the potential harms of secret surveillance).
196. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1148.
197. This is supported by the legislative debates on the amendment. See Jonathan W. Gannon,
From Executive Order to Judicial Approval: Tracing the History of Surveillance of U.S. Persons
Abroad in Light of Recent Terrorism Investigations, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 59, 59–60 (2012)
(“Although Congress eventually passed the [FISA Amendment Act of 2008] with bipartisan
support, the legislative debate focused on several issues, including the incidental collection of
communications of U.S. persons and the minimization of U.S. person information . . . .”).
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that the “choices [of independent third parties] have been or will be made in
such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.”198
The text of Section 1881a undoubtedly indicates that the overall focus
of the statute is surveillance of “certain persons outside the United
States,”199 but there is also language that implies, if not directly states, that
U.S. persons like the plaintiffs were thought to be affected, although not
targeted, by the law. The limitations provision of Section 1881a specifies
that authorizations may not “intentionally target” U.S. persons living in the
United States or abroad.200 Based on the term “intentionally,” this provision
appears to permit the acquisition of such communications if the acquisition
occurs incidentally or accidentally. The targeting provision also requires
that the government “prevent the intentional acquisition of any
communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are
known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.”201
This language does not mean, however, that the targeting must prevent the
intentional acquisition of communications between individuals located
outside the United States and individuals located in the United States. This
was the exact scenario facing the plaintiffs in Amnesty International.202
As the Court pointed out, the statute requires that all authorizations
conform to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.203
This
requirement appears four times in total204 but seems somewhat redundant
regardless of its frequency. The targets Section 1881a permits—foreign
nationals located abroad—do not have the ability to assert Fourth
Amendment rights, and the limiting procedures required by the law
preclude the intentional targeting of persons located within the United
States who could assert Fourth Amendment rights.205 The remaining class
of people who could be intercepted is composed of unintentionally
intercepted individuals whose communications would potentially not be
protected by the Fourth Amendment because they are not the targets of the
surveillance.206 If, however, unintentionally intercepted people have
conceivable Fourth Amendment claims, these provisions make more sense
and indicate the drafters of Section 1881a were concerned about the

198. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
199. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (Supp. 2012).
200. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (b) (emphasis added).
201. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (d)(1)(B).
202. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1145–46 (2013).
203. Id. at 1148.
204. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(5), (g)(2)(A)(iv), (i)(3)(A), (i)(3)(B) (requiring that the
authorized action be consistent with the Fourth Amendment).
205. See supra Part II.B.1.
206. See supra Part II.B.2.
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potential for intercepting the communications of non-targeted
individuals.207
Despite evidence that the drafters of Section 1881a were concerned
with people like the plaintiffs in Amnesty International, the Court
determined that because the plaintiffs could not be surveillance targets
under the statute, the statute did not regulate them.208 This perfunctory
determination forced the Court to perform the causation and foreseeability
analysis because the Court assumes the injuries of non-targeted plaintiffs
are predicated on the actions of independent third parties, which decreases
the probability the injury will occur.209 Yet, the drafters of Section 1881a
recognized the language permitted the interception of U.S. persons and
therefore added the Fourth Amendment requirements.210 The evidence that
Congress thought the plaintiffs were potential “objects” of the statute’s
authorized actions should have been sufficient for the Court to consider
whether the plaintiffs were asserting injury to a cognizable right.211
C. The Court in Amnesty International Should Have Considered
Narrowly Interpreting the Incidental Interception Exception in
Response to Broad Surveillance Programs
The plaintiffs in Amnesty International, even if the Court had found
they were regulated under Section 1881a, would still have needed to
overcome the incidental interception exception, which exempts from Fourth
Amendment protection intercepted communications of individuals who are
not surveillance targets.212 Supported by Title III wiretapping precedent,213
the exemption has its foundation in physical search and seizure law, which
does not allow non-targeted individuals to challenge searches on Fourth
207. See Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (“It is the duty of the court to give
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute . . . .”).
208. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1148.
209. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“Essentially, the standing question in
such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly
can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”).
210. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(5), (g)(2)(A)(iv), (i)(3)(A), (i)(3)(B) (Supp. 2012).
211. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (“When the suit is one
challenging the legality of government action . . . , the nature and extent of facts that must be
averred . . . depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action . . . .
If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action . . . has caused him injury, and that a
judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.”).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (“If there is
probable cause as to one of the parties to a conversation . . . incriminating statements made by
another party to the conversation can be intercepted and used even though probable cause is not
established as to him.”).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 (1974) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not require law enforcement to identify on requests for wiretapping orders all
those who may be intercepted).
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Amendment grounds.214 The new characteristics of Section 1881a
surveillance, however, make these precedents inapplicable because what
was once “incidental” now has the potential to swallow a significant portion
of intercepted communications and turn a class of U.S. persons into
inadvertent targets.
1.

Broad-scope Surveillance Will Intercept More Than
“Incidental” Communications of U.S. Persons

“Incidental” is typically thought to mean something that happens
unexpectedly when another action occurs, something that happens as a
secondary occurrence of another action, or something that is likely to
happen if another action occurs.215 The overall impression is one of
subordination to another activity or event.216 In programs of broad,
indiscriminant surveillance, by contrast, the likelihood of acquiring
incidental communications increases to the point that the amount of
incidental communications may engulf the amount of targeted
communications.217 By definition, communication requires more than one
person.218 Although in some situations both parties will be targets, the
sheer number of conversations being intercepted makes it almost certain
that the majority of interceptions will be of non-targets.219 In cases like
Amnesty International, if the government is intercepting nearly all of the
communications of the plaintiffs’ clients, the government will likely
214. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (“A person who is aggrieved by an
illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search
of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights
infringed.”); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (“Fourth Amendment rights are
personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”).
215. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 966 (2d ed. 1987).
216. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (6th ed. 1990) (“[d]epending upon . . . something
else as primary”).
217. It is hard to believe that, if the government is requesting all communications from a
country, as the lower court in Amnesty International suggested was entirely within the scope of
Section 1881a authority, the majority of those communications would be of national security
interest. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2011) (describing the
scope of potential authorizations); cf. Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing
Beyond Control, WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secretamerica/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/ (reporting that the NSA collects “1.7
billion e-mails, phone calls and other types of communications” a day).
218. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (6th ed. 1990) (“sharing of knowledge by one with
another”).
219. See Siobhan Gorman & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, New Details Show Broader NSA
Surveillance
Reach,
WALL
ST.
J.
ONLINE,
Aug.
20,
2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324108204579022874091732470
(reporting that although the NSA attempts to filter conversations originating between U.S.
persons, “officials say the system’s broad reach makes it more likely that purely domestic
communications will be incidentally intercepted and collected in the hunt for foreign ones”).
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intercept the plaintiffs’ communications with the clients.220 In fact, such
communications may be highly desirable to the government because of
their content, more so than mundane social communications.221 It is
difficult to imagine, therefore, that any interception of the plaintiffs’
communications with the surveillance targets will be totally inadvertent222
even if their acquisition was not the government’s stated intent.
2. Section 1881a Surveillance Is Distinct from the Surveillance the
Court Previously Considered
As further argument against an exception, the situation in Amnesty
International is distinguishable from cases in which incidental interceptions
were held to be exempt from Fourth Amendment protection. In United
States v. Kahn, the Title III wiretap order was limited in duration and
scope.223 It was also monitored frequently by the court.224 By contrast,
Section 1881a authorizations are longer in duration, broader in scope, and
less monitored by the FISC.225 Because the likelihood and potential
severity of government intrusion are much greater under Section 1881a,
there is more reason to protect those who are not targets of the search.226
For similar reasons of scope, the non-target exception for physical searches
offers inappropriate guidance. Physical searches are subject to bright-line,

220. NSA minimization procedures specifically refer to attorney-client communications, so
the government apparently understands that such interceptions will occur. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 2011 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS
AMENDED,
§
4
(2011),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Minimization%20Procedures%20used%20by%20NSA%20in
%20Connection%20with%20FISA%20SECT%20702.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
221. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1157–58 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the government would want to intercept the types of conversations
plaintiffs have with foreign nationals and would need Section 1881a’s expanded scope to do so).
222. Cf. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
the government’s interception of the communications of an American who was suspected of
working with al Qaeda was not “incidental” because the government should have anticipated that
it would have intercepted his communications).
223. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 154 (1974).
224. Id.
225. See generally 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)–(3) (Supp. 2012) (detailing the FISC’s
responsibilities in reviewing certifications and minimization procedures); see also Amnesty Int’l
USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining that the FISC reviews only “the
government’s general procedures,” not individual surveillance activities).
226. But see Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 640–41 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (claiming that the balancing test used to excuse special exemptions to Fourth
Amendment warrant requirements inexcusably weakens the protections afforded by the
Constitution).
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geographical limitations,227 unlike global communication surveillance,
which can involve many individuals in many countries.228 The potential for
substantial government intrusion militates against an exception.229
Additionally, all U.S. persons do not bear this risk of intrusion
generally and equally. The only U.S. persons who risk incidental
interception are those who interact with non-U.S. citizens living abroad.230
Thus, a risk of significant intrusion is borne by a limited, yet large, 231 class
of people. This is not unheard of in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as
many classes of people have been held to be exempt from various Fourth
Amendment search protections.232 The existence of a phenomenon,
however, does not mean it is equally defensible in all cases. For example,
the Court held in New Jersey v. T.L.O.233 that school administrators are not
required to show probable cause before conducting searches of students.234
The Court reached this conclusion by balancing the intrusion upon the
students’ privacy with the school’s need to create a safe learning
environment.235 Crucially, the Court decided that warrantless school
searches must be “reasonable[],” not that students had no expectation of

227. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1043 (2013) (holding that law
enforcement can only search a person incident to the execution of a search warrant when they are
in the immediate vicinity of the premises being searched).
228. Cf. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing the
scope of surveillance as incorporating five phone lines and a “safehouse” where numerous
individuals stayed “when passing through Nairobi”).
229. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment vanish completely
when we slavishly allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and
other benign purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield them from
the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them the health and strength to carry on.”);
see also id. (“Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known.”).
230. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (permitting the targeting of individuals “located outside the
United States”).
231. The exact number of U.S. persons who could be subject to surveillance is difficult to
determine, but it is indisputable that the government has “overcollect[ed]” information. Eric
Lichtblau & James Risen, Officials Say U.S. Wiretaps Exceeded Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009,
at A1. The ACLU requested information about the extent of FISA surveillance, but the FBI
replied that it would not comply because if people were aware the telecommunication companies
were cooperating, they might sue the companies. Alex Abdo, FBI: If We Told You, You Might
Sue, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (May 10, 2011, 1:02 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/nationalsecurity/fbi-if-we-told-you-you-might-sue-0.
232. See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995) (holding that
public schools could conduct suspicionless drug testing of student athletes); Skinner v. Railway
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (holding that the Federal Railway Administration
regulations allowing for the suspicionless drug testing of railroad workers did not violate the
Fourth Amendment).
233. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
234. Id. at 342.
235. Id. at 340.

1046

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:1018

privacy at all.236 The distinction is important because it indicates that even
when faced with dire social problems, such as student drug use or
violence,237 the Court has still adhered to the Fourth Amendment
cornerstone of “reasonableness” by engaging in a balancing of interests.238
This balancing requirement is incompatible with the blanket acceptance that
the Fourth Amendment does not protect incidentally intercepted people, no
matter the level of intrusion.239
The goal of this Note is not to discount the threat of terrorism and the
government’s need to investigate potential dangers,240 but merely to argue
that the Court should have reassessed the proper balance in light of the
government’s increased authority, rather than using standing to defer to
Congress and the Executive.241 This is also not to suggest that the
government abuses its power by intentionally acquiring information from
U.S. persons. The system of rules created to prevent interception of
domestic information is complex,242 even if it occasionally fails to protect
as intended or if some consider the level of protection unsatisfactory. 243
Had the Court reached the merits of the claims in Amnesty International, it
could have spoken to the sufficiency of the minimization measures as well
236. Id. at 343.
237. See id. at 339 (“[I]n recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms:
drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.”).
238. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (concluding that “the proper balance”
between individual privacy and police safety requires that an officer have “narrowly drawn
authority” to conduct a search for weapons, “where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime”).
239. This acceptance was apparent in the opinions dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (Raggi, J.,
dissenting) (“Coincidental interceptees, however, cannot claim a personal Fourth Amendment
right to be identified or to have probable cause established as to themselves as a precondition to
reasonable surveillance.”).
240. Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
upholding civil liberty to the detriment of safety “will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into
a suicide pact”).
241. The Court in Amnesty International explicitly stated that the “‘standing inquiry has been
especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an
action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.’”
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)).
242. See Stewart Baker, Why the NSA Needs Your Phone Calls . . . and Why You (Probably)
Shouldn’t
Worry
About
It,
FOREIGN
POLICY
(June
6,
2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/why_the_nsa_needs_your_phone_calls
(labeling the minimization procedures “elaborate”).
243. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times per Year, Audit
Finds, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsabroke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (describing the results of an internal NSA audit as finding mostly
unintended violations, but “[t]he most serious incidents included a violation of a court order and
unauthorized use of data [of] about more than 3,000 Americans and green-card holders”).
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as the legal framework that created them. Instead, the opinion artfully
dodged the question by focusing on the probability of injury.
Hence, Amnesty International was a lost opportunity. The drafters of
Section 1881a took care to include protections for U.S. persons by
explicitly prohibiting the government from intentionally targeting them for
surveillance and by requiring that Section 1881a surveillance conform to
the Fourth Amendment.244 The incidental interception exception skirts both
these protections. Because the nature of this surveillance is so different
from the exception’s existing applications, the Supreme Court should have
analyzed whether all interceptions of non-targeted individuals are actually
“incidental.” Even if the Court had found that the incidental interception
exception applied and that the plaintiffs still lacked standing because they
had not asserted a cognizable right, the opinion would have alerted
Congress as to whether additional statutory protections were needed. It
would also have provided guidance for the lower courts. Instead, the
decision rests on a chain of causation argument that seems incredulous to
even a casual observer of current events,245 which, contrary to the
majority’s assertions,246 have shown the government is very likely to
conduct broad-scope surveillance successfully.247
V. CONCLUSION
In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court refused
to grant standing to U.S. persons who feared the U.S. government would
intercept their communications with non-U.S. persons living in foreign
countries.248 The Court found that since the plaintiffs could not be actual
targets of surveillance authorized under the challenged statute, 50 U.S.C.
Section 1881a, they could not show their interception was sufficiently
certain to occur.249 For similar reasons, the plaintiffs’ expenditures in
response to their fear of surveillance could not constitute sufficient injury to
confer standing.250 By refusing to grant standing, the Court severely limited

244. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b) (Supp. 2012) (forbidding the targeting of U.S. persons located
within the United States and requiring that surveillance comply with Fourth Amendment
requirements).
245. See, e.g., Timeline of Edward Snowden’s Revelations, AL-JAZEERA AM.,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/multimedia/timeline-edward-snowden-revelations.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2014) (detailing the documents and information about domestic surveillance leaked
by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden).
246. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013).
247. See id. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing how the 2008 amendments to FISA
have made it more likely the government will collect surveillance).
248. Id. at 1146 (majority opinion).
249. Id. at 1150.
250. Id. at 1152–53.
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the ability of U.S. persons to challenge the increasingly broad surveillance
programs conducted by the federal government.251 Additionally, the
Court’s inquiry into the imminence of the injury will do little to remedy the
confusion and uncertainty regarding when an injury is sufficiently likely to
occur such that a plaintiff can bring suit in federal court.252 The Court’s
analysis will likewise do little to clarify whether incidentally intercepted
U.S. persons can challenge surveillance laws.253 The Court could have
given more guidance to lower courts and Congress had it recognized the
plaintiffs were a class of individuals the drafters of Section 1881a
contemplated as being potentially intercepted individuals254 and, as such,
their claim for standing should have been analyzed under a more lenient
standard.255 Although the Court still could have denied standing by
refusing to narrow the incidental interception exception, the need for robust
Fourth Amendment protection from ever-increasing governmental
invasions of privacy suggests that the Court should reverse its course of
selecting certain activities and people for less Fourth Amendment
protection.256

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
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